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Abstract. This discussion paper reviews the literature on experiences with innovation under
the existing emissions trading schemes in the USA. The basic result from this review is that
the innovation effects triggered by emissions trading have been limited because a) targets
were not constraining in the beginning, especially under the RECLAIM program, and b)
developments outside the permit markets have been exploited to an extent that was previously
unexpected. The latter finding can, however, also be understood in part as a result of market
forces finding creative solutions. A further result is that methodological approaches that
measure innovation behaviour appear to be at least as important for the understanding of the
issue as those looking for actual observed innovation.
JEL: L5; 03; Q 28; Q 48.
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1.  Introduction
With the consensus reached between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers of
the European Union in July 2003, it is now certain that the EU member states will implement
a CO2 emissions trading scheme for large stationary sources in energy conversion and energy-
intensive industries, beginning in 2005 (European Union 2003; for a comment on the general
approach, see Gagelmann/Hansjürgens 2002). It will be the world’s largest deployment of this
environmental policy instrument so far. Given that climate policy goals are frequently very
ambitious - the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, suggests
reducing industrial nations’ greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 - and that innovations
display the potential to reduce the long-term cost of this venture dramatically, an important
question is: Is emissions trading conducive to innovation?
There is little consensus about this issue. The major emissions trading system
currently in place, the “Acid Rain Program” (ARP) in the USA, seems to have created
relatively little “real” innovation: Activities do not go far beyond replacing “dirty” coal with
“cleaner” coal with lower sulfur content. On the other hand, there is the widely shared belief
that emissions trading, henceforth abbreviated as ET, provides a strong and permanent
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incentive for all participants to continually look for new abatement options. These incentives
are created by the fact that additional abatement can be converted into “real money” by
reducing the burden of buying permits or even by selling spare permits in a well-established
ET system.
This discussion paper investigates the issue of the impact of ET on innovation by
structuring the evidence to be found in the literature on the first experiences with ET systems
in the US. Two questions will be addressed: First, how can we measure the innovation effects
that are triggered by ET? Second, does ET have substantial innovation impacts indeed? To
answer these questions, one can either look for empirical evidence on whether substantial
innovation effects are to be observed in existing ET systems. Alternatively, one can compare
ET with a “yardstick” policy instrument. For such a comparison, the typical yardstick is
Command-and-Control (CaC) defining e. g. strict individual technology or emission
standards. In contrast to the received literature, which focuses on either of these two
alternatives, this discussion paper adopts both perspectives.
2
There is a substantial body of theoretical work comparing ET with both CaC and eco-
taxes   see extensive overviews in Kemp (1997) and Jaffe/Newell/Stavins (2000). Two
influential articles by Downing/White (1986) and Milliman/Prince (1989) provided the basis
for a series of further articles, such as Malueg (1989), Jung/Krutilla/Boyd (1996),
Fischer/Parry/Pizer (1998/2003), Requate/Unold (1998/2003), Keohane (1999), and Schwarze
(2001). Many of these articles investigate both the magnitude of the innovation effects and the
question of whether the innovation effects are socially optimal (dynamically efficient), which
is relevant due to the fact that there might be “too much” innovation (see e.g.
Fischer/Parry/Pizer 2003:525). Moreover, while the reduction of abatement costs due to
innovations may be accompanied by ancillary benefits, such as productivity increases with
regard to input factors, there might be a “crowding-out” of R&D activities for other purposes
(see Jaffe/Newell/Stavins 2000: 32).
The results of these studies critically depend on the assumptions that are invoked, for
example, regarding the innovation “spillovers”, fixed costs of technology adoption, and the
social benefit function. While all these articles are based on perfect competition in both the
allowance and product markets, Montero (2002) investigates “direct” as well as “strategic”3
effects of investments in R&D for abatement-cost-reducing innovation under Cournot
(output) and Bertrand (price) competition on product markets. Using Tirole’s (1988: 323-336)
framework of “top dog”, “lean and hungry look” etc., Montero finds that under Bertrand
competition, taxes and ET with auctioned allowances provide higher innovation incentives
than ET with grandfathered allowances or CaC. Under Cournot competition, ET with
grandfathered allowances provides lower incentives than all other instruments.
The empirical literature appears to be less extensive. Work on experiences with ET
and innovation has focused on the comparison between ET and CaC, and covers almost
exclusively the US schemes on air pollution: Burtraw (2000), Bader (2000), Swift (2001),
Keohane (2002), Bañales-Lopez/Norberg-Bohm (2002), Popp (2003) and Ellerman (2003)
investigate or report on the innovation impacts of the ARP; Bader (2000) and EPA (2002)
deal with the anti-smog policy in the Los Angeles area, and Kerr/Newell (2003) with the Lead
Phasedown Program (LPP) for automotive fuels. A brief description on first experiences
under the “NOx Budget Program” in the Northeastern USA is given by Swift (2001). Further
research might be expected from ET covering greenhouse gases in Denmark and the UK.
This paper aims at structuring both the theoretical arguments in favour of or against
ET and the empirical evidence on the first experiences that can be found in the literature.
After clarifying the notions of emissions trading and innovation in Section 2, it attempts to
structure the general claims that are made in the discussion (Section 3). The literature on the
various existing ET regimes is analysed in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2.  The Notions of Emissions Trading and Innovation
Following the definition provided by Sorrell/Skea (1999: 1), “[e]missions trading schemes
allow participants to exchange permits to emit pollution so as to reduce the cost of meeting an
overall environmental goal.” The key is the possibility of trade without explicit intervention
of governments: Within an ET regime, emissions are avoided wherever it is cheapest, while
saved permits migrate to those emitters who need them most.
There are two principal forms of emissions trading, the cap-and-trade and the baseline-
and-credit system. Within a cap-and-trade system, a total emission cap, rather than individual
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Comparisons with eco-taxes are only briefly addressed in this paper, since eco-taxes have hardly been used in
the US and, hence, empirical studies on this issue are not available.4
targets, is set, so that the overall amount of emissions is fixed (see Ellerman/Joskow/Harrison
2003: 4). At the end of a compliance period, all the emissions that each participant caused
during this period have to be covered by the respective number of permits.
3 Within a baseline
and-credit system, individual emission goals, which are often emission rates or efficiency
targets, can be set for each participant. Only the gap between actual emissions and predefined
emission targets must be covered, and only reductions versus the predefined targets are
converted into credits that are eligible for sale. Credits are subject to administrative approval
before they can be sold.
A third type of ET, the averaging system, combines elements of both the cap-and-trade
and the baseline-and-credit system. The averaging system resembles the baseline-and-credit
scheme, except that no pre-trade approval of credits is required (ibid.). While the first ET
systems in the US were baseline-and-credit schemes, almost all of the subsequent ET schemes
have been of the cap-and-trade type. Only the LPP is an averaging programme without a fixed
overall cap. Finally, one can distinguish between “downstream” and “upstream” trading: In
downstream-trading systems, it is the emitter who is obliged to hold permits, in upstream-
trading systems, it is the supplier or importer of fuels. Except for the LPP, all ET systems
discussed here are downstream trading systems.
The process of innovation in the broader sense comprises, according to Schumpeter
(1939), several steps: invention (conceptualisation as an idea or prototype), innovation in the
narrow sense (first commercial application), and diffusion. Innovation in a broader sense can
be product as well as process related, and it can be technical, organisational including
managerial, social or institutional – see e. g. Rennings (1998). In the literature on innovation
experiences with ET, the focus is usually on technical innovations, sometimes extended to
organisational and managerial innovation – see Burtraw (2000) and EPA (2002).
In this paper, I adopt the notion of innovation in the broader sense and I focus on
innovations that lower emission abatement costs. It includes processes or products so far
unknown as well as technically feasible solutions that have not been economically relevant so
far but might become economically competitive as a consequence of a certain regulation.
Burtraw (2000), Bader (2000), Swift (2001), EPA (2002) and Ellerman (2003) describe the
observed innovations mostly qualitatively; they thus focus on innovation outputs, and they
only partially compare these to a situation under CaC.
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Keohane (2002) “measures” innovation incentives by the degree of emitters’
sensitivity to abatement cost variations of different technologies. He postulates that this
reaction is stronger under an ET than under a CaC regime. Popp (2003) analyses whether
there is a more significant progress in terms of abatement efficiency during periods when ET
is in place compared to periods when only CaC is in effect. For this purpose, he investigates
patents for scrubbers (emission removal units) and reports on their efficiency from a
technology database. He distinguishes between cost saving innovation and abatement
efficiency innovation. Kerr and Newell (2003) measure the propensity of technology adoption
of firms with low relative to those with high costs of compliance to test whether the difference
is larger under ET than under CaC, as theoretically predicted by Malueg (1989).
3. Principal Theoretical Arguments
3.1 Incentives
ET systems induce incessant incentives for the investment in R&D and/or the adoption of new
approaches, because the resulting emission abatements lead to lower emission allowance
requirements, whereas abatements efforts beyond the level that is required by the legal
standard are not remunerated within a CaC regime (see e.g. Tietenberg 1985: 32f.,
Downing/White 1986, Sorrell/Skea 1999: 12f. and Kerr/Newell 2003). In short, under an ER
regime there is a permanent incentive for additional improvements of current technologies. It
is important to note that in ET improvements are valuable not only when they lead to cost
reductions for a given abatement level (which is valuable also under CaC), but also when they
lead to better abatement performance (which is not “rewarded” under CaC, Popp 2003).
4
Malueg (1989) criticises Tietenberg and Downing/White for making the comparison
not comprehensive enough since they only address the emitters with low abatement costs,
who would have allowances to sell under E.T. He shows graphically that for emitters with
high abatement costs, the adoption incentive would, in contrast, be higher under CaC where
they have to adopt the new technology to be in compliance while under E.T. they can buy an
allowance cheaper than the adoption of the new technology would be. The overall incentive
for low cost and high cost firms together, then, is unclear.
                                                          
4 As a further argument, it can be stated that under ET, an actor does not have to fear individual “ratcheting“
(tightening of requirements after an innovation has become known). He can therefore be sure to “harvest“ his
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actors. If the innovator remains a seller after ratcheting and subsequent company mitigation activities, the
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In this context, it is important to note that in “real life” regulation (e.g., in the USA),
CaC requirements for the high-cost emitters are frequently relaxed temporarily or
permanently, while they are not accordingly intensified for low-cost emitters (Ellerman 2003:
22.). Then the overall requirements for low cost and high cost firms together are more lenient
than formally prescribed – and thus in effect more lenient than an ET system with formally
equal targets. This occurs because of information asymmetries between regulators and firms
about their true abatement costs: some high-cost emitters identify themselves and ask for
relaxation on “unique hardship” grounds, while those firms whose costs are well below
average do not identify themselves (ibid.). Under ET, it is much harder for a high-cost emitter
to argue for relaxation on unique hardship grounds, when the worst consequence of non-
approval of their appeal is that they must buy permits. Furthermore, the transaction costs of
such an appeal are often higher than using the permit market for purchases, while they may be
lower than the gains from target relaxation under CaC (ibid.).
3.2 Permit Price Trends
The incentive to search for additional abatement is diminished by the persistence of falling
permit prices. These may be the consequence of reinforced technological progress due to
fostered innovation incentives within an ET system: Permit prices will decrease as long as the
regulator does not correctly adjust the overall number of available permits when overall
emissions are substantially and constantly decreasing as a consequence of a fostered
technological progress that outweighs the environmental impacts of economic growth. In this
way, the innovation impacts of ET systems destroy their own basis for further innovation
steps (see Milliman/Prince 1989 and the literature following their article). Thus, in Malueg’s
framework mentioned above, the falling permit prices reduce the additional innovation
incentives for low-cost firms and also increase the relative gains for a high-cost firms in using
the – now cheaper – permit market rather than adopting the new technology. This does not
necessarily mean that the overall incentives are lower under ET – the sizes of the incentives
when compared to each other are still ambiguous - but in changes the sizes in favour of CaC.
When innovation occurs, it lowers the overall abatement costs to society. Therefore, a
higher abatement level would be optimal and the targets of CaC as well as ET would have to
be tightened. However, until such an adjustment is made, ET has the above-mentioned
disadvantage of falling allowance prices. A regulator can, of course, set an increasingly
stringent target path in advance. His ability to do so, nevertheless, depends on his ability to
anticipate technological progress, or to set discretionary target modifications very quickly and7
reliably (Keohane 1999). Based on arguments drawn from public choice theory and real world
political experiences, there are reasons to question the regulator’s ability to do this.
Since the empirical literature focuses on the comparison ET vs. CaC, the comparison
with eco-taxes in this paper is concentrated on that issue that has the highest prominence in
the theoretical literature, namely the price trend. In contrast to allowance prices, the rates of
an eco-tax stay the same after innovation occurs, so eco-taxes create a higher abatement
incentive than ET as long as the rate of technical progress exceeds the rate of economic
growth (and the cap under ET is not reduced accordingly). But is this higher incentive
optimal? The answer is no, when following the notion that innovation is not cost-free: The
now lower social abatement costs mean that more abatement than before would be optimal,
but not to the extent motivated by the – unchanged – tax rate. This holds as long as the
marginal social benefit function is falling with increasing abatement efforts, because then at
the new optimum the marginal benefits of additional abatements would be lower than those
indicated by the tax rate. Conversely, the unchanged cap under ET creates too little incentive,
since after innovation, the marginal social abatement costs are lower than the marginal
environmental benefits of additional action. When innovation occurs and the regulator can
only make discretionary target adjustments with a time-lag, the optimal innovation lies in
between the levels induced by ET and eco-taxes, and their relative performance in terms of
optimal innovation inducement depends, e.g., on the slope of the marginal benefit function of
abatement (Fischer/Parry/Pizer 2003: 534) or the amount of fixed costs (Requate/Unold 2003:
139). On the other hand, the more positive externalities of innovations are assumed which
would outweigh their social costs, the higher the likelihood that taxes are more dynamically
efficient than ET from a an incentive-based perspective under falling allowance prices.
3.3 Variety of Choices
Apart from the incentive question, to which sections 3.1. and 3.2 refer, the variety of potential
compliance options – and therefore also of potential innovative solutions - is a second key
prerequisite to harvest market forces in order to achieve the greatest possible dynamic
efficiency. According to Swift (2001: 322), every cap-and-trade scheme involves a broader
range of available compliance options than all regularly applied forms of CaC: technology
standards prescribe certain technological solutions; input-rate standards leave more flexibility
than the former but still do not reward efficiency measures that lead to fuel input savings;
output-rate standards, finally, do not reward measures of reducing production, such as
demand-side management. Under a cap, in contrast, all these measures are viable options.8
Moreover, under all forms of ET, the range of compliance options includes – in contrast to
CaC – the possibility of “half-way abatement”, that is, to reduce emissions only partly and to
purchase permits in order to achieve a given reduction target (Bader 2000: 116; Swift 2001).
Finally, there is also the business-as-usual option, that is, to buy permits and defer
investments in order to implement a much more advanced and possibly less expensive
abatement technology later on.
5 The increase in the range of options is accompanied by an
increase in competition among alternatives (Burtraw 1996: 80).
3.4 Long-term planning security
While emission targets must be adapted every now and then in order to retain the innovation
incentive, the long term planning security for both emitters and suppliers may be reduced.
Moreover, radical innovations might be better promoted by granting certain revenues over a
limited, but well-defined, time scale rather than immediately exposing them to the
competition with other technologies. In the context of renewable energy sources, this
argument is a key reason why Denmark, Germany and Spain chose fixed tariff payments
instead of quota systems to promote renewables (see Hemmelskamp 1999). Such an approach
is particularly appropriate in case of increasing returns (see Arthur 1989): Economies of scale,
learning effects, network externalities etc. may lead to short run advantages of incumbent
technologies, even if, in the long-run, they should prove to be inferior to technologies that are
based on radical innovations.
3.5 “Signalling effects”
ET necessitates that emitters quantify and compile their total relevant emissions. As a
consequence, emitters might become aware of the magnitude of their emissions for the first
time at all, which may, in turn, lead to the consideration of abatement options and, for
instance, to new internal collaboration networks of, e.g., technical and financial personnel.
4. Lessons from the US Emissions Trading Schemes
So far, qualitative as well as quantitative empirical assessments of emissions trading have
focused on US experience, in particular on the Acid Rain Program - for descriptions, see for
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example Fromm/Hansjürgens (1998) and Ellerman et al. (2000). In this section, we deal with
the innovation aspects related to these ET systems.
4.1 Acid Rain Program
The most comprehensive reviews on the Acid Rain Program (ARP) have been offered by
Burtraw (2000) and Swift (2001). These descriptive analyses arguably include the majority of
innovation developments triggered by the ARP. Both authors identify the substitution of low
for high-sulfur coal to be the dominant abatement strategy during the ARP’s first phase
(1995-2000), followed by end-of-pipe abatement in the form of “scrubbers” that remove SO2
from the exhausts. The coal switches, though, are, to a great part, due to external price
reductions for low sulfur coal, which coincided with the introduction of the ARP. In addition,
Burtraw (2000: 20) indicates that new approaches, such as “blending” (mixing) of different
coal types, occurred in the regulated industries and that the ARP appears to have improved the
efficiency in end-of-pipe abatement. Finally, Burtraw (2000: 22) points out innovative re-
organisation activities within companies. Bader (2000) and Ellerman (2003) also report these
developments, though somewhat less detailed since their focus is more on recent ARP
developments in general.
Swift (2001) furthermore finds that especially the advantages of setting caps rather
than (technology or rate-based) standards and the fact that “any emission reduction is
valuable” (ibid.: 339), have lead to redundancy reducing innovations in scrubbers and their
components (ibid.: 333f.), which resulted in lower compliance costs.
Ellerman (2003) points to the fact that the blending experiments were done step by
step – not least because even with a small portion of low-sulfur coal, marketable emission
reductions could be achieved, while operating safety could be maintained, and subsequently
the low-sulfur portion could be continually increased. Also, the “sulfur gradient” (the price
“surcharge” for coals with a low sulfur content) resulting from the full flexibility in coal use
under ET has lead to increasing efforts to exploit low and mid sulfur coals by producers in the
Midwest and the Northern Appalachia region (ibid.).
Both Swift (2001: 333) and Ellerman (2003) report increased utilisation of those
power plants that have scrubbers. While this may be considered purely an organisational
change, it would be worthwhile to look closer and see whether there are not any new
organisational approaches involved.10
Popp (2003) analyses scrubber patents and combines this with data on the removal
efficiency of installed scrubbers obtained from a plant database by the US Department of
Energy (DOE 1999). He finds that although the number of scrubber related patents was lower
after 1990 (i.e., when the ARP had been politically decided upon) than before this date, the
nature of patented progress changed to be more environmentally friendly: Before 1990
innovations primarily led to cost reductions, whereas after 1990 increases in scrubber
performance also could be seen. This could be explained by the fact that abatement costs are,
in principle, influenced both by costs and performance, but only under economic instruments
can extra abatements be exploited commercially.
6
Keohane (2002) conducts an empirical comparison of emissions trading and CaC by
developing a testable model based on the reasoning that under ET, abatement technique
choices should be more sensitive to variation in abatement costs of different abatement
options (which is in contrast to Popp’s claims, who states that they are equal). After showing
this theoretically, he finds quantitative empirical support for his hypothesis by looking at the
adoption rate for scrubbers as a response to changes in scrubber prices relative to prices for
low-sulfur coals. By using a probit model of 248 firms subject to the ARP and 167 firms
under the “New Source Performance Standards” (CaC), he finds that under ET the firms of
his sample have indeed responded more strongly to relative cost variations than under CaC.
Overall, under ARP, prices came out to be far lower than previously expected. As a
result of discount rates being applied to investments, it appears likely that the prices will
increase throughout Phase II, which started in 2000 with more firms and stricter goals.
However, this increase will be lower than the intensified goals would indicate, since banking
is allowed without restrictions. There seems to be some scope for new technology investment
particularly in later years when much of the accumulated banks has been used up.
A further approach to analyse the innovation outcome of ET is to look at which
technologies could have been expected to be implemented, but did not diffuse in fact. Here, a
deeper literature review would be necessary, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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However, one deeper investigation by Bañales-López/Norberg-Bohm (2002) can be cited
which finds that the use of fluidised bed technology by utilities covered by the ARP’s Phase I
was low in spite of demonstration projects and special provisions for “clean coal
technologies” under ARP. Other abatement options were simply cheaper (ibid.: 1179).
Another reason proposed is the reluctance to undertake major capital investments in an
industry undergoing restructuring (ibid.: 1179).
4.2 RECLAIM
The “Regional Clean Air Incentives Market” (RECLAIM) has been in operation since
1994. The central assessment to date was done by the (federal) US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in 2002. It was based on interviews with representatives from companies,
administration and other stakeholders (e.g. environmental NGOs). The EPA notes that in the
years until 1999, most companies had an excess number of allowances because of a very
generous initial allocation (ibid.: 23). This was done to win support for the instrument. It is
not surprising that this did not foster many capital expenditures or innovative activities. In
fact, EPA (2002: 27) reports that “the market and structure of RECLAIM have not
encouraged innovation to the extent anticipated when the program was developed.”
Furthermore, most industries have relied upon existing “off-the shelf” technologies (ibid.: 26).
One of the potential reasons is that some participants missed regulatory certainty (ibid.: 27).
Bader (2000: 114ff) analogously does not find much innovation evidence so far, but
reports that some firms searched for and implemented non-technical abatement measures
which could be realised because the remainder could be bought on the allowance market –
hence the range of compliance options seems to have been enhanced under ET.
A dramatic price spike occurred in 2000 (EPA 2002: 13 ff.): While a “crossover point”
where “aggregate actual emissions would approach or potentially exceed total allocations”
(ibid.: 13) was already expected for 1998 or 1999, it was instead in 2000 that allowance prices
rose, but then to ten times their previous values. An important factor was the Californian
electricity crisis, in which power plants which previously had been (partly) unused came to
full operation and exhibited a sharp rise in allowance demand. The government had to
intervene and sell additional allowances at a fixed price. Over the coming years, the emission
targets will be gradually tightened. Since - in contrast to ARP - no banking is allowed under
RECLAIM, allowance prices should rise in the future, probably inducing more innovation.12
4.3  NOx Budget Program
In 1999, 12 states in the „Ozone Transport Commission“ (OTC) in the Northeastern
USA started a cap-and-trade scheme to combat NOx as a precursor for ozone leading to
summer smog. The first phase required emission reductions of 55-65% compared to 1990
levels. Swift (2001: 372f.) briefly describes first experiences regarding technology choice: In
contrast to early expectations that many sources would need to install expensive end-of-pipe
technologies such as Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR, capable of emission reductions of
70-90%), the great majority of the coal-fired units opted for operational changes without
significant capital expenses. Through this, they achieved up to 30% emission reductions.
Clearly, this was made possible partly by the fact that (some) other installations that did
implement SCR or other capital intensive technology made up for the difference, and partly
by the “half-way” emission reductions themselves. It would need further investigation to
determine whether elements of these changes can be termed innovative.
Swift also points to the range of technological options (including capital intensive
ones) that are allowed by ET and which have been used, leading to substantial allowance
price decreases over time. He also notes very different reduction levels at different units,
pointing to different technology use at different points in time at the various installations.
Thus, a company that finds it hard to achieve a certain reduction level at one point in time
may find it considerably easier a little later.
It seems difficult from this picture to determine exactly how much innovative activity
has been motivated, but it is much easier to identify a range of compliance options that were
used – driven by the market incentives for any emission reductions - and that lead to
substantial cost reductions.
4.4 Lead Phasedown Program
Under the nation-wide Lead Phasedown Program (LPP), between 1983 and 1987 a
trading provision was incorporated. Kerr/Newell (2003) tested the innovation effects by
means of a duration model.
7 Following Malueg’s argument mentioned above, their hypothesis
was that the “relative adoption propensity of refineries with low versus high compliance costs
was significantly greater under the tradable permit regime than under a nontradable
performance standard.” (ibid.: 4). They were able to support this hypothesis by comparing the
adoption data for a technology used in the process of lead substitution (isomerisation, ibid.:13
13) for those time periods in which ET was applied (1983-1987) to those periods in which
performance standards had to be fulfilled by each refinery individually (ibid.: 5f.)
8. The panel
was composed of 378 refineries (ibid.: 12).
Kerr/Newell thus found that innovation effects of ET “provided incentives for more
efficient technology adoption decisions” (ibid.: 4). This can be understood as transferring the
static (allocation) efficiency argument for economic instruments to the dynamic dimension:
the incentives for technology adoption to occur where it is least expensive are greater under
ET than under CaC (personal information Newell 19.08.03). This allocation-related dynamic
efficiency appears to be different from the question of the efficient (overall) rate of
innovation as mentioned in Sections 1 and 3. Kerr/Newell also found that adoption of
isomerisation was greater in larger refineries (due to economies of scale, management quality,
etc., ibid.: 20), but, interestingly, negatively correlated to the overall company size, which
they attribute to better access in larger companies to other technologies that help in lead
reduction (ibid.: 20).
5. Conclusions
In general, all of the existing US cap-and-trade schemes can be said to have fulfilled
the emission goals and brought about substantial cost reductions. This was not least thanks to
the fact that the permit markets themselves and the compliance provisions functioned, as a
rule, well. Regarding innovation, the picture is not as clear.
In the ARP, prices dropped far more than expected, and this reduced the need for
“real” technological advances, e.g. in combustion technologies. Nevertheless, the exploitation
of the cost decreases in coal extraction and transportation (and the possible enhancement of
these, triggered by ET developments, which Burtraw mentions) can be seen as an innovation
of its own - a result of the incentive to “look where others haven’t looked before”. For the US
economy, this exploitation surely has reduced costs as an outcome of employing market
forces. Furthermore, there were also „real“ innovations, such as in blending, scrubber
technology, or organisational changes.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 Such a model regards the time until a new technology is adopted by individual actors (see Jaffe/Newell/Stavins
2000: footnote 20 on page 19).
8 More precisely, Kerr/Newell use ET as an example for an „economic instrument“, which they compare with
CaC type regulation. In their sample for periods of economic instruments in lead phasedown policy, next to the
period with ET they also include a pre-1979 phase of performance standard which allowed flexibility in lead
content to the refineries, since they treat this flexibility as qualifying for an „economic instrument“ as well.14
When arguing that emissions trading lowers the overall technology forcing effect, it
must be noted that the flexibility and cost reductions promised by ET “ended a decade-long
stalemate on acid rain legislation” (Ellerman/Joskow/Harrison 2003: 34) and won the
government the necessary support for stricter goals. Similar effects are reported for
RECLAIM and the NOx Budget Program (ibid.).
9
For the NOx Budget Program, similar general statements can be given as for the ARP,
except that the developments that brought about the allowance price decreases seem to have
involved a greater number of innovative elements than under ARP. A closer look, taking the
greater database now existing into account, seems worthwhile. The same goes for the
RECLAIM program, where there was little innovation so far, but in recent and coming years
targets are substantially tighter and no banked allowances can be used. Especially the
experiences with RECLAIM also indicate that the concrete institutional design of ET (such as
regulatory certainty or monitoring and enforcement) plays an important role. Experiences
with earlier ET systems (i.e., before ARP and RECLAIM) furthermore indicate that
allowances should be fully fungible and no public case-by-case approval of each single trade
must be required. Only then can market liquidity emerge (Fromm/Hansjürgens 1998: 161),
which is likely to be a further important factor for innovation under emissions trading (and
less of an issue under other economic instruments such as eco-taxes).
While the question on the rate of innovation seems thus hard to answer, the claim that
ET leads to a very efficient use of technological or organisational progress appears to be
clearly justified. Apart from the several different activities applied, e.g. under NOx Budget,
and the resulting allowance price drops, this is supported by Kerr/Newell’s findings on where
adoption took place under the Lead Phasedown Program.
When comparing ET with eco-taxes, the author concludes that the relatively lenient
targets applied in existing ET programs can be assumed to be temporary, to win support
regarding the uncertainties on the emitters’ side about this new instrument. In the long-term,
targets can be expected to be at least as strict, and probably stricter, than under eco-taxes
(with higher innovation incentives as a result), for two political reasons. First, ET allows free
allocation of allowances, thus the financial burden on the emitters is far larger under eco-
taxes, which should result in more resistance and softer targets. Second, it is suggested that
                                                          
9 Of course, the German experience with sulfur abatement in large plants can be seen as a strong counterexample
of this plausible argument: substantial cost reductions and innovations were achieved over the years under a CaC
policy, which moreover involved far stricter goals than the ARP: -90% instead of -50%.15
arguing against a “too high” tax rate is easier than arguing against an overall emissions cap
under ET, since the latter can be derived directly from recommendations by scientists.
Regarding empirical investigation methodology, it appears that because of the non-
constraining targets (in the first years of RECLAIM) and the developments outside the permit
markets which have led to unexpected price drops (in ARP), in the current situation those
articles that measure participants’ adoption behaviour by theoretically derived metrics – like
Keohane and Kerr/Newell - appear to have been at least as important for supporting ET’s role
in innovation inducement as those looking for actual observed innovation. Another argument
for using such “input” indicators is that the target stringency, a central innovation driver (see
Taylor et al. 2003), has been typically different under ET from the stringency under CaC
regulations. Thus, quantitative innovation output results could be biased unless corrections are
made. Other disturbing factors include science or technology-supply driven factors as well as
the ongoing liberalisation in the US electricity industry, which partly coincides with the
introduction of ET.
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